Pengaruh Kualitas Komite Audit dan Tingkat Utang terhadap Manajemen Laba dengan Reputasi Auditor sebagai Variabel Pemoderasi (Studi Empiris pada Perusahaan Sektor Perbankan yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia Periode 2021-2023)
Mohammad Rifqi, R.A. Supriyono, Prof., Dr., S.U., Ak., CA
2026 | Skripsi | AKUNTANSI
Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh kualitas komite audit, baik secara komposit maupun per dimensi (independensi, keahlian keuangan, frekuensi rapat, dan ukuran komite), serta tingkat utang terhadap manajemen laba, dengan reputasi auditor sebagai variabel pemoderasi. Objek penelitian merupakan bank umum konvensional yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama periode 2021 hingga 2023. Sampel diperoleh melalui teknik purposive sampling dan menghasilkan 111 observasi bank-tahun dari 37 bank. Manajemen laba diproksikan dengan Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions yang diestimasi melalui model dua tahap berbasis pemisahan komponen nondiskresioner dan diskresioner pencadangan kerugian pinjaman. Analisis dilakukan menggunakan pendekatan pooled cross-section yang dilengkapi year fixed effects, dengan estimator Pooled Ordinary Least Squares dan cluster-robust standard errors pada level bank. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa seluruh hipotesis tidak didukung. Independensi komite audit berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap manajemen laba, berlawanan dengan prediksi teori keagenan, dan dimaknai sebagai cerminan konservatisme akuntansi di bawah expected credit loss model. Dimensi komite audit lainnya, kualitas komite audit secara komposit, dan moderasi reputasi auditor tidak menunjukkan pengaruh signifikan. Analisis sensitivitas dengan pemisahan arah manajemen laba mengungkap bahwa tingkat utang berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap diskresi income increasing, memberikan dukungan kondisional terhadap mekanisme regulatory covenant. Temuan tersebut mengindikasikan dominasi pengawasan regulatorik Otoritas Jasa Keuangan sebagai mekanisme disiplin yang bersifat substitutif terhadap tata kelola internal. Kontribusi penelitian terletak pada masukan bagi regulator untuk mengevaluasi efektivitas substantif komite audit di luar pemenuhan persyaratan formal.
This study examines the effect of audit committee quality, measured both as a composite index and through its individual dimensions (independence, financial expertise, meeting frequency, and committee size), and leverage on earnings management, with auditor reputation as a moderating variable. The research employs 111 bank-year observations from 37 conventional banks listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange over the 2021 to 2023 period, selected through purposive sampling. Earnings management is proxied by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions estimated through a two-stage model separating nondiscretionary and discretionary components. The analysis applies a pooled cross-section approach with year fixed effects, using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares with bank-level cluster-robust standard errors. Findings indicate that none of the hypotheses are supported. Audit committee independence exhibits a positive and significant effect on earnings management, contrary to agency theory predictions, interpreted as reflecting prudential conservatism under the expected credit loss model. The remaining dimensions, composite index, and Big Four auditor moderation show no significant influence. A sensitivity analysis separating the direction of earnings management reveals that leverage has a positive and significant effect on income-increasing discretion, providing conditional support for the regulatory covenant mechanism. These results suggest that intensive regulatory oversight by the Indonesian Financial Services Authority operates as a substitutive disciplining mechanism displacing internal governance variation. The study contributes to banking governance literature and provides policy implications for regulators to evaluate substantive audit committee effectiveness beyond formal compliance.
Kata Kunci : kualitas komite audit, tingkat utang, manajemen laba, discretionary loan loss provisions, reputasi auditor / audit committee quality, leverage, earnings management, discretionary loan loss provisions, auditor reputation