OPTIMAL PRICING STRATEGIES FOR ELECTRIC TWO-WHEELER BATTERY RECYCLING UNDER GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: A CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA

Zabina Asfahani, Prof. Ir. Bertha Maya Sopha, S.T., M.Sc., Ph.D., IPU., ASEAN Eng.

2025 | Tesis | S2 Teknik Industri

Di banyak negara berkembang, di mana infrastruktur daur ulang formal masih terbatas, sektor informal memainkan peran penting dalam pengumpulan dan pengolahan limbah, termasuk baterai kendaraan listrik roda dua (electric two-wheeler/E2W). Namun, kurangnya regulasi sering kali menyebabkan praktik yang berbahaya bagi lingkungan. Di Indonesia, misalnya, pemulung membongkar dan membakar baterai sealed lead-acid (SLA) secara manual, yang menyebabkan kontaminasi timbal parah dan dampak kesehatan jangka panjang bagi masyarakat sekitar. Berdasarkan permasalahan tersebut, studi ini mengembangkan model rantai pasok tertutup (closed-loop supply chain/CLSC) dua saluran yang mengintegrasikan jalur daur ulang formal dan informal untuk baterai lithium-ion dan SLA di Indonesia, dengan pendekatan teori permainan Stackelberg. Model ini merepresentasikan aliran pengumpulan baterai secara realistis: baterai bekas dapat dikembalikan langsung oleh konsumen ke formal recycler, atau dikumpulkan oleh informal collector dari limbah rumah tangga dan tempat pembuangan akhir. Baik formal recycler maupun informal recycler bersaing dengan menawarkan harga pembelian untuk memperoleh baterai dari informal collector. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk: (1) menentukan optimal pricing decisions dalam daur ulang baterai E2W pada CLSC, khususnya saat sektor informal berperan penting; (2) mengkaji dampak berbagai intervensi pemerintah terhadap strategi harga dan profitabilitas para pemangku kepentingan; dan (3) menilai dampak komparatif intervensi tersebut terhadap total keuntungan stakeholder, dampak lingkungan, biaya pemerintah, dan social welfare secara keseluruhan dibandingkan dengan model dasar. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa: (1) keputusan harga optimal saat sektor informal berperan penting melibatkan integrasi mereka ke dalam CLSC, yang memungkinkan aliran baterai yang stabil, perbaikan dampak lingkungan, dan operasional yang menguntungkan; (2) intervensi pemerintah secara signifikan memengaruhi harga dan profitabilitas, di mana manufacturer memperoleh keuntungan terbesar dari skema insentif dan penalti (reward-penalty), formal recycler dari subsidi, informal recycler dalam model dasar, dan informal collector dari subsidi; serta (3) skema subsidi menghasilkan social welfare tertinggi dengan menyeimbangkan keuntungan, dampak lingkungan, dan biaya pemerintah. Implikasi manajerial dari temuan ini memberikan wawasan praktis bagi pembuat kebijakan untuk merancang sistem daur ulang baterai yang inklusif dan efisien di negara berkembang.

In many developing countries, where formal recycling infrastructure is still limited, the informal sectors play a crucial role in the collection and processing of waste, including electric two-wheeler (E2W) batteries. However, the lack of regulation often results in environmentally hazardous practices. In Indonesia, for example, scavengers manually dismantle and burn sealed lead-acid (SLA) batteries, leading to severe lead contamination and long-term health effects among local communities. Motivated by this challenge, the study develops a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model that integrates both formal and informal recycling channels for lithium-ion and SLA batteries in Indonesia, using a Stackelberg game theory. The model captures realistic battery collection flows: used batteries may be returned directly by consumers to formal recycler or retrieved by informal collector from household waste and landfills. Both formal and informal recyclers compete by offering purchase prices to acquire batteries from informal collector. This research aims to (1) determine optimal pricing decisions for E2W battery recycling in CLSC, particularly when informal sectors play a critical role, (2) examine how different government interventions affect pricing strategies and stakeholder profitability (3) assess the comparative impacts of these interventions on total stakeholder profit, environmental outcomes, government cost, and overall social welfare relative to the baseline model. The findings show that (1) the optimal pricing decisions when informal sectors play a critical role involve integrating them into the CLSC, enabling stable battery flow, improved environmental outcomes, and profitable operations, (2) government interventions significantly influence pricing and profitability which manufacturer profit most from reward-penalty schemes, formal recycler from subsidies, informal recycler in the baseline, and informal collector under subsidies; and (3) the subsidies scheme yields the highest social welfare by balancing profit, environmental performance, and government cost. Managerial implications offer practical insights for policymakers to design inclusive and efficient battery recycling systems in emerging economies.

Kata Kunci : Closed-loop supply chain, Dual channel E2W battery recycling, Informal collector, Formal and informal recyclers, Stackelberg game theory, Trade-in and subsidies scheme, Reward-penalty policy