Pengaruh Kepemilikan Institusional terhadap Kebijakan dan Kepemilikan Insider dalam Konteks Teori Keagenan
SIHOMBING, BINSAR (Adv.: Prof. Dr. Bambang Riyanto), Prof. Dr. Bambang Riyanto
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh kepemilikan institusional terhadap kebijakan hutang perusahaan dan kepemilikan insider dalam konteks teori keagenan. Penelitian ini didasarkan atas hasil studi Bathala et al. (1994) yang menyatakan bahwa institutional ownership mempunyai pengaruh yang negatif dan signifikan terhadap debt ratio dan insider ownership dalam rangka meminimumkan konflik keagenan (agency conflict). Penelitian difokuskan pada perusahaan industri manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta untuk tahun 1990 sampai dengan 1996. Pengumpulan data dilakukan secara pooling dan diperoleh sampel sebanyak 167 perusahaan-tahun. Untuk menguji hipotesis digunakan metode kaudrat terkecil dua tahap (two stage least squares). Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa institutional ownership mempunyai pengaruh yang negatif dan signifikan terhadap debt ratio dan insider ownership. Hal ini mencerminkan bahwa kehadiran kepemilikan institusional dapat menggantikan hutang dan kepemilikan insider dalam rangka meminimumkan biaya keagenan. Pengujian terhadap persamaan debt ratio secara simultan dengan uji F menghasilkan bahwa institutional ownership dengan variabel kontrol earning volatility, size, growth dan insider ownership memiliki koefisien determinasi sebesar 0,51622. Artinya, institutional ownership dengan variabel kontrol yang digunakan mampu menjelaskan variasi di dalam perubahan debt ratio sebesar 51,62%. Sedangkan pengujian terhadap persamaan insider ownership menunjukkan bahwa institutional ownership dengan variabel kontrol stock volatility, size, growth dan debt ratio secara simultan menghasilkan koefisien determinasi sebesar 0,5699. Artinya, institutional ownership bersama variabel kontrol yang digunakan mampu menjelaskan variasi dalam perubahan insider ownership sebesar 56,99%. Berdasarkan hasil pengujian dapat disimpulkan bahwa penelitian ini mendukung hasil penelitian Bathala, et al. (1994) yaitu kehadiran institutional investors dipandang sebagai monitoring agent yang efektif untuk mendisiplinkan tindakan insider khususnya yang bersifat opportunistik sehingga dapat mengurangi biaya keagenan.
The purpose of this research is to test the effect of institutional ownership to corporate debt policy and insider ownership in the context of agency theory. This research is based on the previous research by Bathala, et al. (1994), which found that institutional ownership influenced the debt ratio and insider ownership in order to minimize the agency conflict. The research is focused on manufacture companies listed in Bursa Efek Jakarta for the period of 1990 to 1996. The method of data collection is done by using pooling method and give 167 firm-year observations. This research we use the two stage least squares methode to test the hypothesis. The result of this research shows that institutional ownership have the negative and significant effect to the debt ratio and insider ownership. The result reflect that institutional ownership may replace debt and insider ownership in order to minimize the agency cost. Test of simultaneous debt ratio equation by using F test show that institutional ownership with the control variables of earning volatility, size growth, and insider ownership have coefficient of determination 0.51622. It means that, institutional ownership with those control variables can explain the variation in the debt ratio change by 51.62%. However, the test of insider ownership equation show that institutional ownership with control variables of stock volatility, size, growth, and debt ratio simultaneously produce the coefficient of the determination 0.5699. It means that, institutional ownership with those control variables can explain the variation in insider ownership change by 56.99%. Based on the those result, it can be concluded that this research support the previous study by Bathala, et al. (1994), which found that institutional investors can be shown as the opportunisticly effective monitoring agent that can minimize the agency cost.
Kata Kunci : Teori keagenan, biaya keagenan, kepemilikan institusional, kepemilikan insider dan hutang, Agency theory, agency cost, institutional ownership, insider ownership, debt, simultaneous equation, and two-stage least squares
