Pengaruh pembayaran dividen dan kepemilikan manajerial terhadap kebijakan utang: pengujian teori aliran kas bebas
Achmad Komarudin (Adv.: Prof. Dr. Zaki Baridwan, M.Sc), Prof. Dr. Zaki Baridwan, M.Sc
Penelitian ini, berdasarkan data perusahaan dengan kesempatan perturnbuhan rendah, rnenginvestigasi eksistensi teori aliran kas bebas (FCF). FCF, pernbayaran dividen dan kepernilikan rnanajerial seharusnya rnemiliki pengaruh terhadap kebijakan utang. Berdasarkan regresi OLS (ordinary least square), penelitian ini rnemiliki tiga hasil empiris. Pertama, kesernpatan perturnbuhan rendah rnenirnbulkan biaya keagenan FCF. Pernegang saham dapat rnenggeser biaya keagenan FCF kepada kreditur rnelalui kebijakan peningkatan utang. Peningkatan FCF rnernpengaruhi kebijakan peningkatan utang. Namun, FCF dan ukuran perusabaan yang secara sirnultan rnernpengaruhi kebijakan peningkatan utang rnengindikasikan bahwa FCF rnerupakan insentif bagi rnanajer untuk rnelakukan overinvestment melalui pendanaan utang. Kedua, kesernpatan pertwnbuhan rendah rnenghasilkan laba rendah dan dividen rendall. Akibatnya, pembayaran dividen tidak rnempengaruhi kebijakan utang. T enman ini rnengindikasikan bahwa teori FCF tidak dapat rnenjelaskan eksistensi pengaruh pernbayaran dividen terhadap kebijakan utang. Akhimya, kepernilikan manajerial merniliki pengaruh penyejajaran (alignment effect) kepentingan antara manajer dan pemegang saham. Pengaruh ini mengurangi biaya keagenan FCF yang dipikul pernegang saham dan kreditur. Oleh karena itu, kepemilikan manajerial mernpengaruhi kebijakan penurunan utang.
This study, using the firm data of low growth opportunity, investigates the existence of free cash flow (FCF) theory. FCF, divident payment and managerial ownership ought to affect on the debt policY. Based on OLS (ordinary least square) regression, this study has three empirical results. First, low growth opportunity generates agency cost of FCF. Owners can shift their agency cost of FCF for creditors, through the policy of increasing debt. The increasing of FCF influences the policy of increasing debt. However, the simultaneous effect of FCF and firm size on the policy of increasing debt indicate that FCF is an incentif for managers to conduct overinvestment through the debt financing. Second, low growth opportunity yield low profit and low divident. Consequently, divident payment does not influence the debt policy. This finding indicates that FCF theory cannot explain the existence of divident payment effect on the debt policy. Finally, managerial ownership has the effect of interest alignment between managers and owners. This effect reduces agency cost of FCF shouldered by owners and creditors. Therefore, managerial ownership influences the policy of reducing debt.
Kata Kunci : aliran kas bebas, kesernpatan pertumbuhan rendall, pernbayaran dividen, kepemilikan manajerial, dan kebijakan utang, free cash flow, low growth opportunity, divident payment, managerial ownership, and debt policy.
