

ABSTRAK

Sengketa *anti-dumping* antara Uni Eropa dengan Cina terkait panel surya merupakan kasus sengketa *anti-dumping* terbesar yang pernah ditangani oleh Komisi Eropa. Berbeda dengan keputusan yang diambil dalam berbagai sengketa serupa, dalam sengketa ini, Komisi Eropa akhirnya memutuskan untuk menghentikan pengenaan tarif *anti-dumping* terhadap panel surya Cina di tahun 2018 sebelum batas waktu maksimal pengenaan tarif pasca *expiry review* berakhir. Menggunakan *three-level game theory*, skripsi ini berupaya untuk menganalisis alasan Komisi Eropa menghentikan pengenaan tarif *anti-dumping* terhadap panel surya Cina. Skripsi ini menemukan bahwa Komisi Eropa memutuskan untuk menghentikan pengenaan tarif karena adanya tekanan dari level internasional, regional, dan domestik yang dihadapi oleh Komisi Eropa dan memengaruhi *win-set* yang dimiliki. Di level internasional, Komisi Eropa menghadapi ancaman dan retaliasi dari pemerintah Cina dalam bentuk pemberlakuan tarif bagi beberapa produk Uni Eropa. Di level regional, Komisi Eropa menghadapi penolakan dari 18 negara Uni Eropa terhadap proposal perpanjangan pengenaan tarif untuk lima tahun. Di level domestik, terdapat tuntutan dari mayoritas konstituen domestik untuk menghentikan pengenaan tarif sesegera mungkin. Pada akhirnya, dengan keberadaan tekanan dari ketiga level tersebut, penghentian pengenaan tarif *anti-dumping* terhadap panel surya Cina menjadi titik persinggungan antara *win-set* Uni Eropa dengan *win-set* Cina. Keputusan penghentian pengenaan tarif ini merupakan keputusan yang paling dapat memaksimalkan kemampuan Komisi Eropa dalam memenuhi tuntutan domestik sekaligus mengakomodasi keinginan negara mitra demi meminimalisir kerugian akibat berlanjutnya ketegangan di level internasional.

Kata kunci: Komisi Eropa, tarif *anti-dumping*, panel surya, Cina, *three-level game*, tekanan

ABSTRACT

The anti-dumping dispute between the European Union and China over solar panels is the largest anti-dumping dispute ever handled by the European Commission. In contrast to the decisions taken in similar disputes, in this dispute, the European Commission decided to stop the imposition of anti-dumping tariff on Chinese solar panels before the maximum time period of tariff imposition post expiry review ended. Using three-level game theory, this thesis seeks to analyze the reasons why European Commission stopped the imposition of anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels. This thesis finds that the European Commission decided to stop the imposition of tariff because there were pressures from the international, regional, and domestic level that was faced by the European Commission and affecting its win-set. At the international level, the European Commission faced threats and retaliation from the Chinese government in the form of tariffs impositions on several European products. At the regional level, the European Commission faced rejection from 18 EU countries on the proposals to extend the imposition of tariffs up to five years. At the domestic level, there were demands from the majority of domestic constituents to stop the imposition of tariffs as soon as possible. In the end, with the presence of pressures from the three levels, the termination of anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels became the intersection point between European Union win-set and Chinese win-set. This decision to stop the imposition of tariff is the decision that best maximizes the European Commission's ability to meet domestic demands while at the same time accommodating the desire of partner country in order to minimize cost due to the continuation of tension at the international level.

Keywords: *European Commission, anti-dumping tariff, solar panel, China, three-level game, pressures*