

## ABSTRAK

Pada 28 Desember 2015 Jepang dan Korea Selatan secara resmi menandatangani 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement on Comfort Women sebagai resolusi final dan tidak dapat dibalik atas *jugun ianfu*. Namun, muncul perbedaan respon di domestik Jepang dan ROK atas negosiasi 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement on Comfort Women. Domestik Jepang sangat mengapresiasi dan mendukung hasil kesepakatan, sementara domestik Korea Selatan justru memberikan kecaman. Skripsi ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis bagaimana perbedaan respon di domestik Jepang dan Korea Selatan atas negosiasi ini muncul dengan menggunakan kerangka analitis Teori Two-Level Game Robert Putnam. Penelitian dilakukan dengan menganalisa negosiasi 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement on Comfort Women untuk melihat bagaimana tekanan-tekanan di level internasional dan domestik mempengaruhi jalannya negosiasi yang memicu perbedaan respon. Skripsi ini menyimpulkan bahwa perbedaan respon atas negosiasi muncul dikarenakan tiga hal utama. Pertama, pengabaian para mantan *jugun ianfu*, serta LSM Dewan Korea dalam negosiasi level II domestik Korea Selatan. Kedua, penolakan pihak Jepang atas *win-sets* utama Korea Selatan yang meminta Jepang untuk menyetujui pengukuhan keputusan kabinet atas pengakuan dan permintaan maaf Pemerintah Jepang. Ketiga, kuatnya koalisi Abe dalam perpolitikan domestik serta dukungan mayoritas publik Jepang yang dimilikinya, mempengaruhi strategi yang diambil oleh PM Abe.

Kata Kunci : 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement on Comfort Women, Hubungan Jepang-Korea Selatan, *jugun ianfu*, *two-level game*

## ABSTRACT

On December 28<sup>th</sup> 2015, Japan and Republic of South Korea formally agreed on *2015 Japan-ROK Agreement on Comfort Women* as the final and irreversible resolution of *jugun ianfu*. However, there were differences responses in Japanese and ROK domestics toward *the 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement on Comfort Women* negotiations. Japan's domestic highly appreciated and supported the outcome of the agreement, while South Korea's domestic criticized. This thesis aims to analyze how the different responses in domestic Japan and South Korea to these negotiations emerged using the analytical framework of Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory. The study was conducted by analyzing the 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement on Comfort Women negotiations to see how pressures at the international and domestic levels affected the course of negotiations that triggered different responses. This thesis concluded that differences in response to negotiations arise due to three main arguments. First, the neglect of former *jugun ianfu*, as well as the Korean Council in South Korea's domestic level II negotiations. Second, Japan's refusal of the main *win-sets* of South Korea which asked Japan to approve the inauguration of the cabinet's decision on the Japanese government's acknowledgment and apology. Third, the strength of Abe's coalition in the domestic politics and the support of the majority of the Japanese public that he had, influenced the strategy taken by PM Abe.

Keywords : 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement on Comfort Women, Japan-South Korea Relation, *jugun ianfu*, *two-level game*