



*Abstract*

*Conceptualizations of International Organizations (IOs) as platforms for power struggles or vehicles for projecting national interests at the international level have long dominated the scholarly literature. However, empirical cases have shown the ability of IOs to be an autonomous actor with its own interest. The autonomy of IOs generally explained through the power-delegation from the principle-agent analysis, yet it proves to be insufficient in explaining the interest disjuncture between states and IOs. This paper argues unpacking IOs as a bureaucracy is a necessary measure to further understand how IOs are able to gain their power and become autonomous. For the study, this paper uses a qualitative method through a case study of World Bank as a prominent IO in the global world. The findings prove how the very nature of the bureaucracy itself brought IOs power to be an autonomous actor. To which, the two-essential elements of bureaucracy, its legitimacy of the rational authority and control over expertise were considered to be the IOs' source of power.*

*Keywords: International Organizations (IOs), Autonomy, Bureaucracy, World Bank*