



ABSTRAK

Tesis ini menganalisis politisasi operasi MINUSCA di Republik Afrika Tengah akibat kontestasi kepentingan Prancis dan Rusia. Menggunakan kerangka *Calculated Political Will*, *Instrumentalization*, dan *Spoilers*, penelitian ini mengungkap bahwa transisi misi didorong oleh strategi Prancis untuk melakukan *risk transfer* dan *burden sharing* kepada PBB demi meminimalisir risiko domestik. Prancis melakukan *instrumentalization* melalui Dewan Keamanan PBB untuk mengamankan kendali strategis, namun tindakan ini menciptakan celah legitimasi yang dimanfaatkan Rusia sebagai *spoiler operasional* melalui Wagner Group yang berubah menjadi Korps Afrika. Manuver Rusia secara nyata menyebabkan kesulitan pada operasional misi, yang ditandai dengan kurangnya dukungan Pemerintah Republik Afrika Tengah, terhambatnya rotasi dan mobilisasi pasukan, hingga pada akhirnya mengakibatkan terhambatnya otoritas operasional dan terancamnya keamanan pasukan MINUSCA di Republik Afrika Tengah. Penelitian ini memberikan kontribusi keilmuan bagi disiplin Hubungan Internasional dan kajian *peacekeeping operations* dengan memberikan pembuktian empiris bahwa kesulitan operasional suatu misi perdamaian di Republik Afrika Tengah pada dasarnya merupakan implikasi langsung dari kontestasi kepentingan. Temuan ini menegaskan bahwa kepentingan aktor sejak tahap perencanaan dapat menghambat capaian tujuan misi di Republik Afrika Tengah serta memperburuk kompleksitas serta ketidakstabilan keamanan di wilayah konflik melalui persaingan pengaruh antar aktor.

Kata Kunci: MINUSCA, Politisasi Pasukan Perdamaian, Prancis, Rusia, Republik Afrika Tengah.

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the politicization of MINUSCA peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic, driven by the contestation of interests between France and Russia. Utilizing the frameworks of Calculated Political Will, Instrumentalization, and Spoilers, this study reveals that the mission transition was propelled by France's strategy to implement risk transfer and burden sharing through the UN to minimize domestic risks. France engaged in instrumentalization within the UN Security Council to secure strategic control, yet this created a legitimacy vacuum exploited by Russia as an operational spoiler through the Wagner Group, which transitioned into the Africa Corps. Russia's maneuvers have significantly caused difficulties in mission operations, marked by a lack of support from the Government of the Central African Republic, hindered troop rotation and mobilization, and ultimately resulting in the obstruction of operational authority and threats to the security of MINUSCA personnel in the Central African Republic. This research contributes to International Relations and peacekeeping studies by providing empirical evidence that operational difficulties in a mission in the Central African Republic are direct implications of interest contestation. These findings emphasize that actor interests from the planning stage can hinder the achievement of mission goals in the Central African Republic and exacerbate the complexity and security volatility in conflict zones through the competition for influence between actors.

Keywords: Central African Republic, France, MINUSCA, Politicization of Peacekeeping, Russia.