

ABSTRAK

Berangkat dari satu anomali elektoral: kemenangan PDIP sebagai partai tunggal non-koalisi dalam Pilkada Kota Yogyakarta 2024. Kemenangan ini menarik karena untuk pertama kalinya partai ini berhasil merebut kursi Wali Kota Yogyakarta, di tengah dominasinya sebagai mayoritas parlemen (DPRD) sejak Pemilu 1999. Berbeda dengan kecenderungan politik nasional, dari 30 daerah dengan konfigurasi “PDIP versus KIM Plus”, hanya Kota Yogyakarta yang sukses memenangkannya, meskipun tanpa status petahana (*unincumbent*) dan berada di tengah dominasi KIM Plus yang hadir tanpa fragmentasi signifikan. Dalam kondisi yang timpang ini, muncul ruang untuk mempertimbangkan faktor alternatif yang mampu menjelaskan kemenangan PDIP di Kota Yogyakarta, yakni penggunaan strategi non-programatik melalui integrasi kerja antara mesin partai dan broker politik. Untuk menganalisis lebih dalam, penelitian ini menggunakan kerangka teori distribusi politik, dan mesin partai–broker politik oleh Stokes *et al.* (2013). Secara metodologis, penelitian ini menerapkan pendekatan kualitatif dengan desain studi kasus. Data diperoleh melalui wawancara mendalam terhadap elite mesin partai dan broker politik, serta analisis dokumen resmi kepemiluan dan pemberitaan media. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa kemenangan PDIP sebagai partai tunggal non-koalisi dalam Pilkada Kota Yogyakarta 2024 ditopang oleh kerja terintegrasi antara mesin partai struktural–parlemen, dan jaringan broker politik melalui strategi non-programatik yang bekerja secara masif dan sistematis hingga ke basis lawan. Melalui dominasi di DPRD, PDIP menciptakan *shadow incumbency effect* yang memungkinkan kandidatnya (Hasto–Wawan) mampu menikmati distribusi sumber daya negara layaknya kandidat petahana. Selain itu, melalui praktik *elite patronage fragmentation*, PDIP mampu memecah kohesi koalisi lawan melalui tawaran posisi strategis kepada elitnya di parlemen. Temuan ini menunjukkan bahwa dalam kompetisi elektoral yang asimetris, efektivitas mesin partai dan broker, fragmentasi internal lawan, serta pengelolaan strategi non-programatik secara simultan dapat menentukan kemenangan.

Kata kunci: PDIP, partai tunggal non-koalisi, strategi non-programatik, mesin partai, dan broker politik.

ABSTRACT

This study departs from a significant electoral anomaly: PDIP's victory as a single, noncoalition party in the 2024 Yogyakarta City mayoral election. This victory is particularly striking as it marked the first time the party succeeded in winning the mayoral office, despite having maintained parliamentary dominance in the local legislature (DPRD) since the 1999 general election. Contrary to national electoral trends, among the 30 regions characterized by a "PDIP versus KIM Plus" configuration, only Yogyakarta City resulted in a PDIP victory, despite the absence of incumbency and the presence of a cohesive and structurally dominant KIM Plus coalition. Under these asymmetrical conditions, this case opens analytical space to consider alternative explanatory factors behind PDIP's victory in Yogyakarta City—namely, the deployment of nonprogrammatic strategies through the integrated operation of the party machine and political brokers. To examine this dynamic more closely, the study employs the theoretical framework of political distribution and the party machine–broker model developed by Stokes et al. (2013). Methodologically, the research adopts a qualitative approach with a case study design. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with party machine elites and political brokers, as well as through the analysis of official electoral documents and media coverage. The findings demonstrate that PDIP's victory as a single, noncoalition party in the 2024 Yogyakarta City mayoral election was supported by the integrated functioning of the party's structural and parliamentary machines, together with an extensive network of political brokers, operating through nonprogrammatic strategies deployed massively and systematically—even within opposition strongholds. Through its dominance in the DPRD, PDIP generated a shadow incumbency effect that allowed its candidates (Hasto–Wawan) to enjoy access to state resource distribution comparable to that of incumbent candidates. Furthermore, through practices of elite patronage fragmentation, PDIP was able to erode the cohesion of the opposing coalition by offering strategic parliamentary positions to rival elites. These findings indicate that in asymmetrical electoral competition, the effectiveness of party machines and political brokers, the internal fragmentation of opponents, and the simultaneous management of nonprogrammatic strategies can be decisive in determining electoral victory.

Keywords: *PDIP; single noncoalition party; nonprogrammatic strategy; party machines; and political brokers.*