

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ackerman, K. (2024). *The Impact of China's Ban on Gallium, Germanium, and Antimony on Semiconductor Companies*. Sourceability.com.  
<https://sourceability.com/post/the-impact-of-chinas-ban-on-gallium-germanium-and-antimony-on-semiconductor-companies>
- Adams, M. (2023, December 19). *A Brief History of the Crazy, Momentous, Billion-Dollar Chip Wars Between the US and China - Z2Data*. Www.z2data.com.  
<https://www.z2data.com/insights/billion-dollar-chip-wars-between-the-us-and-china>
- Akayama, S., Chow, D., & Gupta, S. (2024, June 4). *Localizing the Global Semiconductor Value Chain* | Arthur D. Little. Arthur D Little.  
<https://www.adlittle.com/id-en/insights/report/localizing-global-semiconductor-value-chain>
- Alhammadi, A. (2021). THE NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM BEHIND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DURING COVID-19. *World Affairs*, 185(1), 147–175.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00438200211065128>
- Allen, G. C. (2023). China's New Strategy for Waging the Microchip Tech War. *Www.csis.org*.  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-strategy-waging-microchip-tech-war>
- Badlam, J., Clark, S., Gajendragadkar, S., Kumar, A., O'Rourke, S., & Swartz, D. (2022, October 4). *The CHIPS and Science Act: What is it and what is in it?* | McKinsey & Company.  
<https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/the-chips-and-science-act-heres-whats-in-it>

BIS. (2022, October 7). *BIS Press Release Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Controls FINAL*. Doc.gov.

<https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3158-2022-10-07-bis-press-release-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-controls-final/file>.

Bransetter, L. (2024, July). *EXPORT CONTROLS AND US-CHINA TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD*. Brookings.

[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/20240701\\_Branstetter\\_Sanctions.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/20240701_Branstetter_Sanctions.pdf)

Bureau of Industry and Security. (2023, October 25). *Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Updates and Corrections*. Federal Register.

<https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/25/2023-23055/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-items-supercomputer-and>

Chu, M.-C. M. (2023). China's defence semiconductor industrial base in an age of globalisation: Cross-strait dynamics and regional security implications. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2164852>

CSET. (2020, July 27). *State Council Notice on the Publication of Certain Policies to Promote the High-Quality Development of the Integrated Circuit Industry and the Software Industry in the New Period*.

[https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0195\\_IC\\_software\\_policy\\_EN.pdf](https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0195_IC_software_policy_EN.pdf)

Descartes. (2025). *U.S. Semiconductor Export Control Rules* | Descartes Systems Group. Descartes.com.

<https://www.descartes.com/resources/knowledge-center/us-announces-strict-export-control-regulations-to-address-national-security-concerns>

Dew, N., & Lewis, I. (2024). U.S. Defense Innovation and Industrial Policy: An Assessment of Where Things Currently Stand. *Expeditions with MCUP*, 2024(5).

<https://doi.org/10.36304/expwmcup.2024.05>

Ernst, D. (2016). China's Bold Strategy for Semiconductors Zero-Sum Game or Catalyst for Cooperation? *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2836331>

Ezell, S. (2024, August 19). *How Innovative Is China in Semiconductors?* Itif.org; Information Technology and Innovation Foundation | ITIF.

<https://itif.org/publications/2024/08/19/how-innovative-is-china-in-semiconductors/>

Federal Register. (2023). *Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Updates and Corrections*. Unblock.federalregister.gov.

<https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/25/2023-23055/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-items-supercomputer-and>

Gerring, J. (2017). Qualitative Methods. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20(1), 15–36.

<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-092415-024158>

Goodrich, J. (2024, May 29). *China's Evolving Semiconductor Strategy - IGCC*. University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

<https://ucigcc.org/blog/chinas-evolving-semiconductor-strategy/>

Gopi, A. (2023, June 30). *The Global Race for Semiconductor Dominance*. Wwww.linkedin.com.

<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/global-race-semiconductor-dominance-anishia-gopi>

- Guo, L., Wang, S., & Xu, N. Z. (2021). US economic and trade sanctions against China: a loss-loss confrontation. *Economic and Political Studies*, 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2021.1920195>
- Hamdani, M., & Belfencha, I. (2024). Strategic Implications of the US-China Semiconductor Rivalry. *Discover Global Society*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-024-00081-5>
- Hashmi, F. (2021, October 25). *When the chips are down: The politics of the semiconductor*. YDS. <https://www.theyoungdiplomats.com/post/when-the-chips-are-down-the-politics-of-the-semiconductor>
- Hunt, W. (2022). *Reshoring Chipmaking Capacity Requires High-Skilled Foreign Talent Estimating the Labor Demand Generated by CHIPS Act Incentives CSET Policy Brief*. AUTHOR Will Hunt. <https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Reshoring-Chipmaking-Capacity-Requires-High-Skilled-Foreign-Talent.pdf>
- Intel. (2023, May 26). *What are Semiconductors?* Newsroom. <https://newsroom.intel.com/tech101/what-are-semiconductors#gs.fjohh6>
- Kessler, B. J. (2022, October 28). *State Tax Credits and Incentives Under the IRA or CHIPS Act* | Deloitte US. Deloitte United States. <https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/tax/articles/chips-act-state-tax-incentives.html>
- Kim, Y., & Rho, S. (2024). The US–China Chip War, Economy–Security Nexus, and Asia. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 29. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-024-09881-7>
- Kocs, S. A. (1994). Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: International Law as System Structure. *International Studies Quarterly*, 38(4), 535. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600864>

Kong, X. X., Zhang, M., & Ramu, S. C. (2014). China's semiconductor industry in global value chains. *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 22(1), 150–164.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13602381.2014.990205>

Lee, J., & Kleinhans, J.-P. (2021). *Mapping China's Semiconductor Ecosystem in Global Context Strategic Dimensions and Conclusions*.

[https://www.interface-eu.org/storage/archive/files/chinas\\_semiconductor\\_ecosystem.pdf](https://www.interface-eu.org/storage/archive/files/chinas_semiconductor_ecosystem.pdf)

Lewis, J. A. (2021, June 3). *China: In Search of Tech Supremacy Through Chip Production?* | ISPI. ISPI.

<https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/china-search-tech-supremacy-through-chip-production-30703>

Luo, Y., & Van Assche, A. (2023). The rise of techno-geopolitical uncertainty: Implications of the United States CHIPS and Science Act. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 54(7). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-023-00620-3>

Luo, Y., & Van Assche, A. (2023). The rise of techno-geopolitical uncertainty: Implications of the United States CHIPS and Science Act. *Journal of International Business Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-023-00620-3>

Lv, A., & Munroe, T. (2024, December 3). China bans export of key minerals to U.S. as trade frictions escalate. *Reuters*.

<https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-bans-exports-gallium-germanium-antimony-us-2024-12-03/>

Lynch, D. F. (2008, January 1). *Balance of Power Relationships* (L. Kurtz, Ed.). ScienceDirect;

Academic

Press.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780123739858000155>

Miller, C. (2022). *Chip War*. Simon and Schuster.

MOFCOM. (2023). 商务部 海关总署公告2023年第23号 关于对镓、锗相关物项实施出口管制的公告. Mofcom.gov.cn.

<https://m.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zwgk/gkzcfb/202307/20230703419666.shtml>

Moran, T. H. (1993). An Economics Agenda for Neorealists. *International Security*, 18(2), 211.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/2539102>

Newman, H. F. and A. (2023, September). *Essay | How the U.S. Stumbled Into Using Chips as a Weapon Against China*. The Wall Street Journal.

<https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/how-the-u-s-stumbled-into-using-chips-as-a-weapon-against-china-ec37e32>

Oertel, J., Small, A., & Miller, C. (2022, November 25). *The Global Race for Semiconductor Hegemony* [Podcast].

<https://ecfr.eu/podcasts/episode/the-global-race-for-semiconductor-hegemony/J>

Ong, K. (2024). *China's Defiant Chip Strategy - Foreign Policy Research Institute*. Foreign Policy Research Institute.

<https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/06/chinas-defiant-chip-strategy/>

Pickvance, C. G. (2001). Four varieties of comparative analysis. *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 16(1), 7–28. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41107161>

Ravi, S. (2023, January 26). *SIA Comments: Export Controls Should Protect National Security Without Undermining Innovation*. Semiconductor Industry Association.

<https://www.semiconductors.org/sia-comments-export-controls-should-protect-national-security-without-undermining-innovation/>

Retter, L., Frinking, E. J., Hoorens, S., Lynch, A., Nederveen, F., & Phillips, W. D. (2020). Relationships between the economy and national security: Analysis and considerations for economic security policy in the Netherlands. *Www.rand.org*.  
[https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR4287.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4287.html)

Ryan, M., & Burman, S. (2024). The United States–China “tech war”: Decoupling and the case of Huawei. *Global Policy*, 15(2). <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13352>

Schweller, R. L. (2022, December). *View of Neorealism's Power and Restraint: A Tribute to Waltz on his 100th Birthday*. *Journal of Global Strategic Studies*.  
<https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS/article/view/1165/379>

Serra, F. A. R., Martins, F. S., & Cunha, J. A. C. da. (2018). Secondary Data in Research – Uses and Opportunities. *Revista Ibero Americana de Estratégia*, 17(4), 01–04.  
<https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3312/331259758001/html/#:~:text=In%20simple%20terms%2C%20secondary%20data>

Shivakumar, S., & Wessner, C. (2022, June 8). *Semiconductors and National Defense: What Are the Stakes?* *Www.csis.org*.  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes>

Stenius, K., Mäkelä, K., MiovskýM., & Gabrhelík, R. (2017). How to Write Publishable Qualitative Research. *Publishing Addiction Science: A Guide for the Perplexed*, 155–172.  
<https://doi.org/10.5334/bbd.h>

The People's Government of Fujian Province. (2021, August 9). *Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and Vision 2035 of the*

*People's Republic of China*\_ News\_ 福建省人民政府门户网站. [Www.fujian.gov.cn](http://www.fujian.gov.cn).

[https://www.fujian.gov.cn/english/news/202108/t20210809\\_5665713.htm](https://www.fujian.gov.cn/english/news/202108/t20210809_5665713.htm)

The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy. In *whitehouse.gov* (pp. 1–48). The White House.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

US Congress. (2022, August 9). *H.R.4346 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Supreme Court Security Funding Act of 2022*. [Www.congress.gov](http://www.congress.gov).

<https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346>

Wang, L., & Hewings, G. J. D. (2020). Will Increasing Tariffs on China Really Bring the Manufacturing Plants Back to the U.S.? *Global Economic Review*, 49(2), 127–149.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/1226508x.2020.1744464>

Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

<https://search.worldcat.org/title/Theory-of-international-politics/oclc/4667316>

Weng, K. (2019, September 4). *Student Feature – Spotlight on Qualitative Methods in International Relations*. E-International Relations.

<https://www.e-ir.info/2019/09/04/student-feature-spotlight-on-qualitative-methods-in-international-relations/>