

## ABSTRAK

Artikel jurnal ini memiliki satu pertanyaan mendasar yang akan dijawab; *bagaimana pengaruh sentralitas Ketua Umum Partai Golkar dan Nasdem atas fraksinya di DPR RI terhadap stabilitas kebijakan jadwal pilkada serentak 2024?* Jawaban atas pertanyaan tersebut didapatkan melalui kerangka teori pemain veto yang dikombinasikan dengan konsepsi arus personalisasi partai politik. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif studi kasus eksplanatori yang dianalisis menggunakan teknik analisis tematik. Golkar dan Nasdem ditempatkan sebagai *most-similar case* dalam *multiple embedded case study*. Kajian ini menemukan bahwa; 1) Wajah *party in public office* Golkar dan Nasdem di legislatif memiliki irisan kuat dengan wajah *party in central office*. 2) Partai Golkar dan Nasdem mengalami personalisasi politik yang tersentralisasi ke ketua umum partai politik, termasuk dalam operasionalisasi hak veto di internal partai. Penelitian ini berargumen bahwa sentralisasi kuasa veto Ketua Umum Partai Golkar dan Nasdem atas fraksi telah meningkatkan stabilitas kebijakan jadwal pilkada, karena berhasil menambah jumlah pemain veto di *uncovered set*, menggeser preferensi fraksi, serta meningkatkan kohesi pendukung status quo. Dengan membuktikan operasionalisasi kuasa veto ketua umum atas fraksi, kajian ini berhasil membantah penelitian sebelumnya yang mendiskreditkan sentralisasi ketua umum di Indonesia tanpa kajian empiris yang memadai.

## Abstract

*This journal article has one fundamental question to answer: how is the influence of the centrality of the General Chairperson of the Golkar and Nasdem Parties over their fraction in the DPR RI on the stability of the 2024 regional election schedule policy? The answer to this question is obtained through the theoretical framework of the veto player combined with the current conception of the personalization of political parties. This research uses a qualitative method of explanatory case studies, which are analyzed using thematic analysis techniques. Golkar and Nasdem were placed as the "most similar cases" in the multiple embedded case study. This study found that: 1) the face of the party in the public office of Golkar and Nasdem in the legislature has a strong wedge with the face of the party in the central office. 2) In the Golkar and Nasdem parties, political personalization was centralized to the general chairman of political parties, including the operation of internal party veto rights. This study argues that the centralization of the veto power of the General Chairperson of the Golkar and Nasdem parties over the fractions has increased the stability of the election schedule policy, because it has succeeded in increasing the number of veto players in the uncovered set, shifting fraction preferences, and increasing the cohesion of supporters of the status quo. This study was able to disprove earlier studies that had criticized the centralization of the general chairman in Indonesia without sufficient empirical investigation, by demonstrating the operationalization of the general chairman's veto authority over the fractions.*