



INTISARI

Meskipun telah banyak studi meneliti efek keberpihakan dalam pengalokasian dana dari pemerintah pusat ke daerah, fenomena *divided government* dan *unified government* berpotensi menimbulkan heterogenitas ukuran efek keberpihakan tersebut. Di sisi lain, efektivitas *divided government* dalam memoderasi motif-motif politik dalam pengalokasian dana transfer belum diketahui secara mendalam. Studi ini berupaya mengisi dua kesenjangan tersebut menggunakan kasus Indonesia yang mengalami *divided government* dan *unified government* di tingkat pusat selama rentang waktu 2014-2017. Desain sampel yang hanya melibatkan 134 daerah yang melakukan pemilihan kepala daerah pada tahun 2018 dan perubahan komposisi koalisi partai politik pada pertengahan tahun 2016 menjamin keacakan keberpihakan politik pada kedua konteks. Dengan menerapkan metode *difference-in-differences*, studi ini menemukan bahwa efek keberpihakan tidak signifikan secara statistik pada konteks *divided government*, akan tetapi sang presiden tetap melakukan pengalokasian strategis dengan menysar daerah-daerah yang dipimpin kepala daerah partai-partai oposisi dengan pemilih mengambang yang dominan. Pada kasus *unified government*, pengalokasian strategis sepenuhnya didasarkan pada keberpihakan politik kepala daerah.

Kata kunci: efek keberpihakan, dana transfer, *divided government*, *unified government*, *difference-in-differences*.



ABSTRACT

Although there have been many studies examining the alignment effect in the allocation of intergovernmental transfer funds, the phenomenon of divided government and unified government has the potential to cause heterogeneity in the magnitude of the alignment effect. On the other hand, the effectiveness of divided government in moderating political motives in the allocation of transfer funds is not yet known in depth. This study attempts to fill these gaps using the case of Indonesia which successively experienced divided government and unified government at the central level during the 2014-2017 period. The sample design involving only 134 districts that conducted local head elections in 2018, as well as changes in the composition of the political party coalition in mid-2016, guarantees the randomness of political alignments in both contexts. By applying the difference-in-differences method, this study finds that in the context of divided government, the magnitude of the alignment effect is not statistically significant, but the president continues to make strategic allocations by targeting districts led by the district head from opposition parties with dominant swing voters. In the case of unified government, the strategic allocation is entirely based on the political alignment of the district head.

Keyword: alignment effect, transfer funds, divided government, unified government, difference-in-differences.